



5G SECURITY CHALLENGES

KTH ACCESS-FORCES CPS WORKSHOP

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Oct 27, 2015

CONTENTS



› Part I: Background

- Mobile network evolution
- Mobile network security – history
- What is 5G and what does it imply for security?

› Part II: Some challenges

AT A GLANCE



#1

MOBILE INFRASTRUCTURE
OPERATIONS & BUSINESS SUPPORT
SOLUTIONS
SERVICES
TV & MEDIA DELIVERY

35,000

Patents

25,000

R&D Employees

32B SEK

In R&D

1 BILLION

Subscribers
managed by us

2.5 BILLION

Subscribers
supported by us

64,000

Services
professionals

227B SEK

Net Sales 2013

50%

LTE smartphone traffic
handled by our networks


180

Countries with
customers

114,000

Employees

PACE OF CHANGE




MOBILE TRAFFIC GROWTH



10x

Growth in mobile data traffic between
2013 and 2019 (monthly ExaBytes)



SECURITY DRIVERS FOR 2G, 3G, 4G



One basic service to protect

- Connectivity, in particular voice

Security needed for trust and business

- User privacy: user data encryption, basic identity protection
- Reliable charging: strong authentication

Slight changes in threats over time

- Led to “incremental” improvements in new generations

Has worked very well

- Some “legacy” crypto problems in 2G, but largely a success

5G USE CASE EXAMPLES




Broadband experience
everywhere anytime



Massive Machine
Type Communication



Entertainment,
Education



Critical Machine
Type Communication


WHAT DEFINES 5G SECURITY?



NEW BUSINESS & TRUST MODELS



NEW SERVICE DELIVERY MODELS



INCREASED PRIVACY CONCERNS



EVOLVED THREAT LANDSCAPE

BUSINESS AND TRUST MODELS



Re-use of 5G outside telco, new actors in value chain

New types of roaming agreements, e.g. between traditional operator and industry vertical

Third party VNFs running inside 5G network

The concept of “device” will change in nature, e.g. capillary networks, sensors ranging from low cost “motes” to absolutely mission critical ones


5G SERVICE DELIVERY



More agile and cost-effective deployment of new services on all layers




Network components
Mobility policy data plane



Distribute



Network components




Virtualization



SDN-enabled network

Toolbox to build dedicated service





PRIVACY



Amount of end-to-end encrypted traffic has already grown dramatically after mass surveillance allegations

Big data generated in 5G systems open enormous opportunities but also potential for unprecedented privacy breaches

EVOLVED THREAT LANDSCAPE



Society has become more dependent on communication systems

Trend increases with mission-critical use of 5G, IoT, and the Networked Society

Increased threat level to our systems and software

- › increased attack surface
- › increased value for attackers of telecom systems
- › increased damage when attacks happens

KEY SECURITY AREAS FOR 5G



Cyber-attack resistance

Trust and assurance

Privacy

Virtualization and SW security

Coop with KTH already established



CYBER-ATTACK RESISTANCE




We have so far assumed “friendly” devices, following standard radio protocols

– But new tools for attackers...



Software Defined Radio

Should consider protection against malfunctioning or malicious M2M devices at all layers down to PHY layer



PoC demo at MWC 2014

TRUST, ASSURANCE, COMPLEXITY



- › 5G systems will mix equipment from
 - Telecom providers (e.g. Ericsson)
 - IT providers (e.g. Cisco, IBM)
 - Industry/automation (e.g. ABB)
 - Plethora of “devices” (meters, cars,.....)
- › 5G role as critical infrastructure may require special compliance and “security certifications”
 - General IT Assurance (ISO 15408, “Common Criteria”)
 - Road safety (ISO 26262)
 - Health (ISO 27799)
 - Smart grid (IEC)
 - National regulations
- › How can we manage these complex systems?
 - Can we avoid network-wide multi-certification?
 - Can we use common “trust anchors” for all use-cases?



PRIVACY (VERY CONCRETE EXAMPLE)

- › So called “IMSI catchers” are making headline news
- › “Wearable” devices will increase threats
- › We should improve security against “tracking” in 5G

Secret surveillance of Norway's leaders detected

Members of parliament and the prime minister of Norway are being monitored by means of secret espionage equipment.

Andreas Bakke Foss , Per Anders Johansen , Fredrik Hager-Thoresen

Oppdatert: 16 des. 2014 14:53

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Norway's major secrets are being administered here, right in the centre of Oslo. A number of the most important state institutions are situated within a radius of one kilometer. The Prime minister's office, the Ministry of defence, Stortinget (parliament) and the central bank, Norges Bank. Ministers, state secretaries, members of parliament, state officials, business executives and other essential staff engaged in protecting the nation's security, our military and our oil wealth – totalling more than 6000 billion kroner (NOK) - are working within this area.



The norwegian parliament - Stortinget - is situated in the centre of Oslo
#OTO, Monica Stremdan

But passers-by are hardly aware of the following fact: In several locations someone has installed secret transmitters which most probably behave like fake mobile base stations. These so called IMSI-catchers can monitor all mobile activity in the vicinity.

The people who run this surveillance equipment may in principle monitor every person moving in and out of the parliament building, the government offices or other institutions in the area. They can also select



Se forskjellen

Samme sek
Ulik pris

 Prsjakt

 SISTE NYTT

WASHINGTON D.C. IS LITTERED WITH PHONY CELL TOWERS

THE RUSSIAN EMBASSY, WHITE HOUSE, SUPREME COURT, AND OTHER LANDMARKS HAVE SOME NOSY NEIGHBORS, CLAIMS THE MAKER OF AN ULTRASECURE MOBILE PHONE.

By Andrew Rosenblum Posted September 18, 2014

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SUMMARY



- › We believe 5G Security to consist of four main “new” topics
 - New trust models
 - New ways to deliver services
 - Increased concerns for privacy
 - Evolved threat landscape



ERICSSON